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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
therefore recover from the unreleased tortfeasor only one half,
or his virile share, of the total amount of damages sustained.
Since the released tortfeasor cannot be liable to the unreleased
tortfeasor for all or part of the sum that the latter may be re-
quired to pay, the unreleased tortfeasor cannot implead the re-
leased party on a third-party demand.
It is submitted that the court, in deciding the instant case,
was guided by the manifest intention of the legislature to erase
any distinction between delictual and contractual solidary lia-
bility. To force a debtor released by a compromise with the
creditor to contribute to an unreleased debtor who has been com-
pelled to pay more than his virile share would destroy the
effectiveness of a compromise and release, unless all parties
could be brought into the settlement negotiations. This court, by
applying article 2203 in full to delictual obligations, holds that
discharge of one solidary debtor discharges his proportionate
share of liability. The decision encourages compromise as a
method that is preferable to litigation for effective settlement
of tort liability without impairing the unreleased debtor's rights
or doing inequity to the claimant.
David E. Soileau
CIVIL PROCEDURE-FILING SUIT IN COURT OF
INCOMPETENT JURISDICTION
Plaintiffs, in a joint action, seek to recover damages for the
alleged wrongful death of their husband and father who was
electrocuted on March 1, 1960, while working near power lines
of defendant, a Florida corporation with its principal place of
business in New Orleans. Plaintiffs, citziens of Louisiana, filed
suit in federal district court on February 6, 1961, which was
within the one-year prescriptive period;' however, due to admin-
istrative delay, service of citation was not made on defendant
corporation until the prescriptive period had expired. 2 The fed-
eral district court, on its own motion, dismissed the action for
lack of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. The present action
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3536: "The following actions are prescribed by one
year: That for . . . damages . .. resulting from offenses or quasi offenses .... "
2. Service of citation was made on March 3, 1961, or 24 days after the suit
was filed in United States District Court.
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was then filed in a Louisiana district court on April 6, 1962.
This court sustained the defendant's plea of one year's prescrip-
tion and dismissed the action. The First Circuit Court of Appeal
affirmed. Held, federal court being a court of incompetent juris-
diction, the filing of suit in that court did not interrupt the pre-
scription period; and, since service was not made on defendant
during the prescriptive period, plaintiffs' cause of action pre-
scribed, although the delay in service after filing was not attrib-
utable to the plaintiffs. Sansone v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., 164 So.2d 151 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
Article 3518 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides that pre-
scription shall be interrupted by the service of citation upon the
defendant within the prescriptive period.3 In suits against cor-
porate defendants, R.S. 12:66 authorizes interruption of pre-
scription by the mere filing of suit in a court having jurisdic-
tion over the corporation.4 Prior to its amendment, R.S. 9:58015
3. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3518 (1870) : "A legal interruption takes place, when
the possessor has been cited to appear before a court of justice, on account either
of the ownership or of the possession; and the prescription is interrupted by such
demand, whether the suit has been brought before a court of competent jurisdiction
,or not. The provisions of this article likewise apply to actions ex delicto, hereto-
fore or hereafter filed, in a United States District Court of America, when and if
said court holds it is not a court of competent jurisdiction."
Article 3518 is found in the section of the Code dealing with acquisitive pre-
scription; however, the jurisprudence is well settled that the method of interrup-
tion found in that article pertains to liberative prescription. See Perkins v. Long-
Bell Petroleum Co., 227 La. 1044, 81 So.2d 389 (1955); Knight v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 160 So.2d 832 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
The jurisprudence has consistently maintained that service of citation, within
the prescriptive period, will interrupt the accrual of prescription. See Perkins v.
Long-Bell Petroleum Co., supra; Conkling v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 166
So. 2d 68 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964) ; Knight v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
supra; Nettles v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 155 So.2d 87 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963) ;
Mayon v. Delta Well Logging Serv., Inc., 127 So.2d 16 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961) ;
Cupples v. Walden, 124 So.2d 613 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1960) ; Hidalgo v. Dupuy,
122 So. 2d 639 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960) ; Harris v. Lopez, 109 So. 2d 496 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1959) ; Babers v. Jolly, 107 So.2d 81 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958) ;
Dumont v. Henserling, 62 So.2d 864 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1953) ; Flowers v. Pugh,
51 So.2d 136 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951) ; Taglialavore v. Ellerbe, 149 So. 296 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1933) ; Agurs v. Putter, 137 So. 640 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931)
Adams v. Citizens' Bank, 136 So. 107 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931).
4. LA. R.S. 12:66 (1928) : "In all suits against corporations, all prescriptions
against corporations shall be interrupted by the filing of the suit in the court
having jurisdiction of the action against the corporation."
5. Before its amendment LA. R.S. 9:5801 (1950) provided: "The filing of a
suit in a court of competent jurisdiction shall interrupt all prescriptions affecting
the cause of action therein sued upon, against all defendants, including minors and
Interdicts." The courts have interpreted "competent court," within the meaning
of article 3518 and R.S. 9:5801 as a court having jurisdiction ratione materiae
and personae. See Flowers v. Pugh, 51 So.2d 136 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951);
Comment, 14 TuL. L. Rav. 601, 603 (1940). When the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure was adopted the French concepts "jurisdiction ratione materiae" and
"jurisdiction personae" were replaced with the Anglo-American terms "jurisdic-
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allowed interruption of prescription against all defendants by
the filing of suit in a court of competent jurisdiction and proper
venue.6 The jurisprudence has indicated that R.S. 12:66 and R.S.
9:5801 are not in conflict and can be applied interchangeably
against corporate defendants.7 In order to consolidate the meth-
ods of interruption, the legislature recently amended R.S.
9:5801.8 Thus, according to R.S. 9:5801 as amended, prescrip-
tion may be interrupted in two ways: first, by the filing of suit
within the prescriptive period in a court of competent juris-
diction and proper venue; second, by service of citation within
the prescriptive period when the suit has been filed in a court
of incompetent jurisdiction or improper venue.9
In the instant case the suit was filed in the federal court
twenty-two days before the lapse of the one-year prescriptive
period, but service of citation was not made until two days after
the accrual of prescription. Plaintiffs contended that the filing
of suit in the federal court interrupted prescription. Alterna-
tively, plaintiffs alleged that the twenty-four-day administrative
delay between the filing and service should not be charged
tion over the subject matter" and "venue." A definition of "competent court" is
found in LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 5251(4) (1960) : 'Competent court'
or 'court of competent jurisdiction,' means a court which has jurisdiction over
the subject matter of, and is the proper venue for, the action or proceeding." See
Knight v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 160 So.2d 832 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
6. The jurisprudence is well settled that the filing of suit in a court of com-
petent jurisdiction interrupts prescription as to all defendants. See Davis v. Lewis
& Lewis, 226 La. 1059, 78 So.2d 173 (1954) Schrader v. Coleman E. Adler &
Sons Inc., 225 La. 352, 72 So. 2d 872 (1954) ; Reeves v. Globe Indem. Co., 185
La. 42, 168 So. 488 (1936) ; Mayon v. Delta Well Logging Serv., Inc., 127 So.2d
16 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961) ; Cupples v. Walden, 124 So.2d 613 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1960) ; Banks v. K & H Stock Farms, 97 So.2d 444 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957) ;
Dumont v. Henserling, 62 So.2d 864 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1953) ; Flowers v. Pugh,
51 So.2d 136 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951) ; Blanchard v. Smith, 45 So.2d 527 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1950).
7. See Guadin v. Cunningham, 164 So.2d 624 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964)
Flowers v. Pugh, 51 So.2d 136 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951).8. LA. R.S. 9:5801 (Supp. 1964): "All prescriptions affecting the cause of
action therein sued upon are interrupted as to all defendants, including minors and
Interdicts, by the commencement of a civil action in a court of competent juris-
diction and in the proper venue. When the pleading presenting the judicial
demand is filed in an incompetent court, or in an improper venue, prescription
is interrupted as to the defendant served by the service of process." This amend-
ment was not intended to affect the existing methods of interruption or to provide
an additional method of interruption. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 421,
comment (e) (1960) ; Knight v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 160 So.2d 832
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1964) ; The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1962-1963 Term-Civil Procedure, 24 LA. L. REV. 291 (1964).
9. The jurisprudence has supported this interpretation of LA. R.S. 9:5801.
See Conkling v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 166 So.2d 68 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1964) ; Knight v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 160 So.2d 832 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1964) ; Nettles v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 155 So.2d 87 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963)
Cupples v. Walden, 124 So.2d 613 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1960).
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against them in determining whether prescription had accrued.
In rejecting plaintiffs' first contention the court applied 28
U.S.C. § 1332(c), which provides that a corporation shall be
deemed a citizen of both the state of incorporation and the
state in which it has its principal place of business. 10 Since
defendant corporation had its principal place of business in New
Orleans and plaintiffs were citizens of Louisiana, the federal
court manifestly lacked diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.
Thus the federal court was a court of incompetent jurisdiction
within R.S. 9:5801, and prescription was not interrupted by the
mere filing of suit within the prescriptive period. More sig-
nificantly, the court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the
administrative delay between the filing of suit and service was
not chargeable against them. Applying R.S. 9:5801, the court
reasoned that although filing suit in a court of incompetent
jurisdiction within the prescriptive period did not operate to
interrupt prescription, service of citation within the prescrip-
tive period would have been sufficient to do so. In so holding,
the court recognized that the purpose of allowing the filing of
suit in a court of competent jurisdiction to interrupt prescrip-
tion was to relieve a plaintiff of the burdens of administrative
delays in the service of citation when he has complied with the
required procedure in R.S. 9:5801.11 Clearly, since the plaintiff
has little control over the time when service of citation is made,12
a plaintiff who files a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction
and proper venue within the prescriptive period should not be
charged with subsequent administrative delays in service. On
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1958) : "For the purposes of this section and section
1441 of this title, a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any state by which
it has been incorporated and of the state where it has its principal place of busi-
ness." The legislative history of this statute indicates that its intended purpose
was to narrow the scope of jurisdiction, not to broaden it. The practice sought
to be curtailed consisted of filing claims in federal courts between essentially
local parties based on the fiction that one of the parties, a corporation, was chart-
ered in another state. See Nayer v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 200 F. Supp. 319
(D. N.H. 1961) ; 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3101 (1958).
11. 164 So.2d at 154. See Taglialavore v. Ellerbe, 149 So. 296, 297 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1933) ; of. Conkling v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 166 So.2d 78
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1964). Therefore, if the suit is filed in a court of competent
jurisdiction, prescription is interrupted and it is immaterial, in regard to the
accrual of prescription, when service is made. See Cupples v. Walden, 124 So.2d
613 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1960) ; Hidalgo v. Dupuy, 122 So.2d 639 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1960) ; Dumont v. Henserling, 62 So.2d 864 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1953).
12. Some courts have taken the position that the officer of the court was
in some respects under the plaintiff's direction, and if the officer fails in his duty
he becomes responsible to the plaintiff. See Ficklin v. New River Drainage Dist.,
133 La. 203, 62 So. 632 (1913) ; of. Blanchard v. Smith, 45 So.2d 527 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1950) ; Taglialavore v. Ellerbe, 149 So. 296 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933).
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the other hand, the court reasoned that plaintiff should be
charged with the effects of administrative delays in service
when the suit is filed in a court of incompetent jurisdiction,
since he has the choice of the forum. Consequently, when a
plaintiff chooses a forum of incompetent jurisdiction or improp-
er venue, he should be required to bear the consequences of any
administrative delays in service of citation.13
It is submitted that this decision was necessary and proper
in the interest of efficient judicial administration. There is no
doubt that the effects of the accrual of prescription can be
harsh, as demonstrated by the instant case. On the other hand,
prescription serves to prevent defendants from being harassed
by long-delayed suits and suits with no foundation which are
purposely delayed, so that evidence will be lost and the defend-
ant encouraged to settle his case without going to trial. When
viewed in this light, it appears that the court was wise in not
relaxing the strict rules governing the interruption of prescrip-
tion. In the future, in order to avoid a plea of prescription from
being sustained when federal jurisdiction is uncertain, it would
be prudent for plaintiff's attorney to verify the service of cita-
tion before the end of the prescriptive period. As an alternative,
filing the suit in both the federal court and the state court
within the prescriptive period would insure preservation of the
plaintiff's cause of action; however, this latter procedure is
more expensive for the plaintiff, and duplicate filing is scarcely
conducive to efficiency and economy in judicial administration.
Charles S. McCowan, Jr.
CORPORATE LAW - RESTRICTIONS ON
ALIENABILITY OF STOCK
Four non-stockholders desired to purchase a controlling
interest in a corporation from defendant, a majority share-
holder. The articles of incorporation contained the following
restriction on the alienability of stock: before sale of stock to
13. This reasoning is in accord with the jurisprudence. See Conkling v. Loui-
siana Power & Light Co., 166 So.2d 68 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964) ; Knight v. Loui-
siana Power & Light Co., 160 So.2d 832 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964) ; Hidalgo v.
Dupuy, 122 So.2d 639 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960) ; Flowers v. Pugh, 51 So.2d 136
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1951).
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